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INTRODUCTION
[T]he gap between the burgeoning hundreds of international
environmental laws and the actual condition of the environment – [is]
perhaps one of the largest contradictions of our time.
Alexander Gillespie, “International Environmental Law and
Policy”1
The high number of multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) negotiated by
the international community is impressive. There are over 500 MEAs, covering such
diverse issues as loss of biological diversity, pollution of the atmosphere, ocean
degradation and deforestation.2 Moreover, the commentators suggest that compliance
with the obligations agreed to in MEAs is generally high.3 Yet, despite the large number
of MEAs, and high compliance rate, there is growing concern that the state of the
environment continues to deteriorate at an unprecedented scale.4

One reaction to the observation that MEAs are not effectively addressing
environmental problems has been a call to intensify the obligations assumed by the
parties to MEAs. That is, resolution of global environmental problems requires “deeper

1

Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law and Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 67, 77 (Klaus Bosselmann & David Grinlinton eds., 2002).
2
International Environmental Governance Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Summary, U.N.
Environment Programme, 1st mtg., Provisional Agenda Item 3 at 3, UNEP/IGM/1/INF/1 (2001) at
http://www.unep.org/IEG/docs/working%20documents/MEA_summary/IGM-1-INF-1.doc. See the
ECOLEX website at http://www.ecolex.org/ and the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators
website at http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/ for current information on the number and diversity of MEAs.
3
E.g. David D. Victor, Enforcing international law: implications for an effective global warming regime,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 151 (1999).
4
For example, Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L.
259, 263 (1992) comments there is a strong argument that despite the proliferation of MEAs, “the
environmental situation in the world became worse and is deteriorating further.” See also Jacqueline Peel,
New State Responsibility Rules and Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Obligations: Some Case
Studies of How the New Rules Might Apply in the International Environmental Context, 10 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82 (2001); Victor, id.
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cooperation.”5 The most recent example of this is the climate change regime. To
respond to the problem of global warming, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change6 (“FCCC”) outlines a framework of action for Parties to stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions.7 At the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties
however, the adequacy of the commitments in the FCCC was a critical issue.8 The
Parties entered negotiations to strengthen efforts to address global climate change
resulting in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.9 In contrast to the FCCC, which merely
encouraged Parties to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Protocol sets
quantifiable greenhouse emission limitation and reduction commitments for certain
developed country Parties.10

The introduction of emission commitments in the Kyoto Protocol was accompanied
by negotiations concerning not only how to ensure compliance with those commitments,

5

Depth of cooperation refers to the extent to which a treaty “requires states to depart from what they would
have done in its absence.” George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the good news
about compliance good news about cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996). See discussion below
under the heading “The Enforcement Model: Political Economics Theory.”
6
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M.
849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/conv/conv.html [hereinafter
FCCC].
7
Article 2 of the FCCC.
8
Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-By-Article Textual History,
Prepared under contract to UNFCC, FCCC/TP/2000/2 (2000) 6, at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/tp/tp0200.pdf. See also International Institute for Sustainable Development,
Summary of the First Conference of the Parties for the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 28
March – 7 April (1995) 12(21) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb1221e.pfd.
9
The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (not
yet in force), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter the Kyoto
Protocol]. To enter into force the Kyoto Protocol requires ratification by 55 Parties to the FCCC including
Annex I parties accounting for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions of that group in
1990 (Article 25). Presently, 110 parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol representing 43.9 per cent of
total carbon dioxide emissions. FCCC website at http://unfccc.int/ (last modified on June 6, 2003). Given
the current position of the United States against ratification, to enter into force the Kyoto Protocol will need
Russia’s ratification.
10
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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but also possible enforcement mechanisms in the case of non-compliance.11 Despite the
reportedly high compliance rate with many other MEAs, in the face of binding emission
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties wanted assurance that these would be
backed by a credible compliance system.12 However, this increased attention to
compliance is not restricted to the climate change regime. It is part of a recent
development in the negotiation of MEAs to introduce treaty specific compliance regimes,
as well as to introduce enforcement mechanisms.13 Therefore, the question addressed in
this paper is: is stronger enforcement necessary to secure compliance with MEAs?

To consider that question, this article reviews the recent literature on compliance with
international law and applies the leading theories to MEAs. This literature increased
dramatically at the end of the last century as scholars from various disciplines including
law, political science and political economics endeavored to explain the causal link
between state behavior and compliance with international law.14 The scholars sought an
answer to the compliance question: “why do nations obey international law?”15

11

Fiona Mullins, Kyoto Mechanisms, Monitoring and Compliance From Kyoto to the Hague: A selection of
recent OECD and IEA analyses on the Kyoto Protocol, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris (2001) 41, at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00023000/M00023447.pdf.
12
G.H. Addink, Working Paper for the 10th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Joint Working Group Compliance on the Kyoto
Protocol: An Overview of Suggestions on Compliance 8 (1999) at
http://www.library.uu.nl/publarchief/jb/artikel/addink/full.pdf. In general the traditional international law
remedies are viewed as inadequate to secure compliance with MEAs. See discussion below under the
heading: “I. Conceptual Framework: B. The Starting Block.”
13
M. A. Fitzmaurice & C. Redgwell, Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law,
31 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 35, 42 (2000).
14
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); George W. Downs et al., supra note 5; Oran
R. Young et al., Regime Effectiveness: Taking Stock, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 249 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999). For a summary of earlier theories on
compliance and international law see Harold Hongju Koh, Why do nations obey international law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997).
15
Koh, id.

4

This discussion is divided into three parts. Part I sets up a conceptual framework for
understanding the literature. First, I define the terms “compliance,” “enforcement” and
“effective.” Secondly, I set out the underlying assumptions most authors make either
explicitly or implicitly, before they consider the compliance question.

Part II of this discussion sets out the compliance continuum16 by identifying the
contemporary schools of thought on why nations comply with international law: the
managerial school, fairness theory, transnational legal process, reputational theory,
international relations theory and the enforcement model. In considering each theory, I
outline what the scholars tell us about the compliance question, focusing specifically on
MEAs. I also consider what each theory tells us about whether enforcement is a
necessary component of a compliance regime in the MEA context.

Part III of this discussion then provides an analysis of the literature, noting where the
theories converge, the key points of contention among the leading scholars, and
suggestions for further research.

In sum, based on the current literature, my conclusion is that in general, nations
comply with MEAs because of shallow cooperation; states spend significant time and
resources negotiating agreements reflecting no more that current domestic policies. This
explains the observation that global environmental degradation is continuing despite the

16

See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13, at 42 who refer to the compliance ‘continuum’ in the
context of analyzing non-compliance procedures.
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high compliance rate with MEAs. Therefore, to meaningfully address global
environmental problems, we must introduce more onerous obligations in MEAs, thereby
increasing the depth of our co-operation. However, ensuring compliance with increased
obligations requires not only stronger, but legitimate enforcement mechanisms, as
illegitimacy was one of the primary justifications for theories against the use of stronger
enforcement mechanisms. By creating stronger, legitimate enforcement mechanisms, we
may be able to move beyond compliance, and begin to tackle the issue of effectiveness in
international environmental law.

I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Definitions
The key terms used in the literature are “compliance,” “enforcement” and
“effectiveness.” These concepts are discussed below.

Compliance refers to whether states meet their obligations in an accord,17 or put
another way, whether their behavior conforms with legal rules.18 These obligations can
be both procedural, such as a requirement to report, and substantive, such as an
undertaking to control an activity.19 Additionally, some scholars extend the concept of
compliance to incorporate whether the spirit or intent of the treaty has been met,20
17

Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1, 4 (Edith Brown Weiss
& Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES].
18
Note however, the concept is not uncontested. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a
Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) 49 who argues that the meaning of compliance
“cannot be taken as shared,” but depends on which legal theory of international law is applied.
19
Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 17.
20
Id.
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although this conceptualization presents obvious empirical analysis difficulties.21 A
compliance mechanism is a provision in a treaty designed to encourage compliance,
including positive incentives such as financial or technical assistance.

In contrast, enforcement is the implementation of consequences for non-compliance
with obligations in an accord.22 These consequences can vary from financial penalties,
the withdrawal of privileges, or sanctions including trade, military and economic
sanctions.23 Enforcement can either be external to the international agreement, or part of
a treaty specific non-compliance procedure.24 A compliance regime may incorporate
both compliance and enforcement mechanisms, as both are designed to secure
compliance.25

21

Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 5 (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick, eds.,
1996).
22
See George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 319, 320
(1998) who notes that in political economic literature “enforcement generally refers to the overall strategy
that a State or a multilateral adopts to establish expectations in the minds of state leaders and bureaucrats
about the nature of the negative consequences that will follow from noncompliance.” He comments that
international lawyers tend to focus only on formal enforcement provisions under international law, rather
than “extra-legal” enforcement strategies.
23
See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to
Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 17, at 511, 542-547 for a discussion of different
strategies for encouraging compliance.
24
See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13 at 36 who note recent MEAs incorporating non-compliance
procedures include, inter alia, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), available at
http://www.unep.ch/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf [hereinafter the Montreal Protocol], and the
Kyoto Protocol.
25
See for example, the Kyoto Protocol compliance regime in the Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from Oct. 29 to Nov. 10, 2001, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken
by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 24/CP.7, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance
under the Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf which sets up a compliance
committee with a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
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Securing compliance, however, does not guarantee the effectiveness of the
international agreement; effectiveness goes beyond adherence to legal obligations.26
Raustiala identifies the “common-sense notion” of effectiveness is whether the treaty
solves “the underlying problem.”27 Ehrmann suggests that in the MEA context
effectiveness refers to, “whether the condition of the environment is improved.”28 Yet,
although the problem-solving definition of effectiveness is intuitive, there may be many
factors that contribute to resolving an environmental problem. The difficulty lies in
isolating the role of an MEA.29 Accordingly, many scholars ask a different question in
considering the effectiveness of an MEA, namely, whether the MEA contributed to
influencing a change in behavior.30 Finally, although compliance and effectiveness are
conceptually distinct, Mitchell observes, “compliance can provide a valuable proxy for
effectiveness … .”31 Several authors consider that understanding why nations comply
with international law can help in analyzing how to increase the effectiveness of
international law.32

B. The Starting Block
Current academic thought on the compliance question begins from the same starting
block: the claim that based on empirical observations compliance with international law

26

See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13, at 43 n.35.
Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 387, 393 (2000). See also Arild Underdal, One Question, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIME EFFECTIVENESS 3, 4 (Miles et al. eds. 2002).
28
Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO.
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 377 (2002). Note Ehrmann, at 378 defines effectiveness to incorporate the
problem solving meaning and also whether a treaty can change behavior.
29
Raustiala, supra note 27, at 393 and 394.
30
Id. at 394.
31
Mitchell, supra note 21, at 25.
32
See e.g. Raustiala, supra note 27, at 412.
27
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is high.33 Most authors agree that the famous assertion by Louis Henkin that, “almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time,”34 is an accurate description of contemporary state
behavior.35 The field of international environmental law is often cited to support this
claim.36 For example, a study by Weiss and Jacobson on compliance with MEAs found
that for the five treaties studied, compliance was comparable, or better than compliance
with national laws and regulations within the United States, and with Community
regulations and directives within the European Union.37

Linked to the observation that nations generally comply with international law, is a
general consensus that understanding why they comply is one of the central questions
currently challenging international legal scholarship. As Guzman comments:

33

Victor, supra note 3; Koh, supra note 14; Downs, supra note 5.
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed., 1979) (emphasis omitted).
35
Note many authors omit, as I have, the introductory words to Henkin’s quote “[i]t is probably the case
that” E.g. Koh,supra note 13, at 2599; Kyle Danish, Management v. Enforcement-The New Debate on
Promoting Treaty Compliance, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 789 (1997). However, this claim is not entirely
uncontested. See Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, Or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note 18, at 21, 23; Peel, supra note 4, at
82. Note also that the area of human rights provides a disturbing exception to the conventional view that
international law is complied with. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 16.
36
Chayes & Chayes, id.; Victor, supra note 3.
37
Supra note 23, at 512. The five treaties covered by the study are: World Heritage Convention, Nov. 16,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975), available at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/world.heritage.1972.html; Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
(entered into force July 1, 1975), available at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/cites.trade.endangered.species.1973.html; Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention of 1972), Dec. 29,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975) available at
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/texts/marine.pollution.dumping.of.wastes.1972.html; 1983
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, Misc 11 (1984); Cmnd 9240 (entered into force
Apr. 1, 1985) available at http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/tropical.timber.1983.html and the Montreal
Protocol.
34
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[T]he failure to understand the compliance decision is troubling because
compliance is one of the most central questions in international law. Indeed, the
absence of an explanation for why states obey international law in some instances
but not others threatens to undermine the very foundations of the discipline.38

The question is central to international law “from both a theoretical and practical
perspective … .” 39 From a practical perspective, we need to understand why nations
comply to know how to design international accords to ensure future compliance.40
Furthermore, we have no assurance that compliance will remain high if we do not
understand the causal link. From a theoretical perspective, the question is fundamental
because if compliance with international law is merely a coincidence, it begs the question
why have international law at all.

The final point of consensus in the compliance literature relates to the inadequacy of
the Law of State Responsibility to either explain the high compliance rate, or to secure
compliance with MEA obligations. The Law of State Responsibility prescribes the legal
consequences and the procedures for implementing those consequences for breach of an
international legal obligation, in the absence of specific provision in an international
agreement.41 However, in general this law is viewed as unsuitable to enforce MEAs.42

38

Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826
(2002).
39
Koh, supra note 14, at 2599. See also Victor, supra note 3, at 164: “[a]t stake is not only a theory of
compliance, but also dramatically different policy prescriptions for how to design effective mechanisms for
addressing non-compliance.”
40
Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (1998).
41
See the Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International
Law Commission Fifty Third Session, GA Fifty-Sixth Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (2001) at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm.
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One of the difficulties with the Law of State Responsibility is identifying a state injured
by breach of an MEA obligation. 43 This is evident in the case of environmental damage
caused by the cumulative effects of activities by multiple states, such as ozone depletion
or global warming.44 Moreover, the remedies of restitution or compensation under the
Law of State Responsibility are inappropriate in the environmental context, particularly
where the aim of a regime is to prevent irreversible environmental damage.45 Therefore,
although not all authors explicitly discuss this issue, it seems reasonable to infer the high
compliance rate with international law is not explained by a fear of the general sanctions
under the Law of State Responsibility.46 This inference is also supported by the trend in
MEA negotiations to introduce non-compliance procedures.47

Overall, scholars generally agree that compliance with international law is high,
especially with MEAs. However, the Law of State Responsibility does not explain the
high compliance levels. Therefore, we need an adequate explanation of why compliance
is high, to encourage future compliance, especially as the obligations agreed to in MEAs
increase, as well as to justify the existence of international law. The literature differs on
explanations for the “why” question. While most authors begin from the same starting
block, they take different paths on the compliance continuum.

42

See Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the
Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT’L ENV. L. 123 (1992); Ehrmann, supra note 28 at 379.
43
Jacob Werksman, Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a “Flexible” Regime, 9
Y.B. INT’L ENV. L. (1999) 48, 60.
44
Ehrmann, supra note 28 at 380.
45
Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13.
46
Note that the law of treaties is another traditional avenue available under international law to secure
compliance. In the climate change context there are similar difficulties associated with the law of treaties
as for the Law of State Responsibility. Werksman, supra note 43, at 58.
47
The Kyoto Protocol provides the most recent example of this. Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13.
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II. THE COMPLIANCE CONTINUUM
The compliance continuum is the range of theories explaining why nations comply
with international law. It is bordered at one end by the managerial school of Abram and
Antonia Chayes, and at the other by the enforcement model of George Downs. The
continuum represents a general transition from legal theorists relying on normative
arguments and against using enforcement to secure compliance with international law, to
political economists relying on instrumentalist arguments who advocate for the use of
enforcement in instances where the stakes are high. Moreover, as the debate moves more
towards supporting enforcement, effectiveness becomes a key focus, rather than just
compliance with international law, especially in the MEA context.

A. The Managerial School: Or the “Chayesian approach”
The New Sovereignty by Abram and Antonia Chayes marks one end of the compliance
continuum and the start of the contemporary discussion on understanding compliance
with international law. One of the central arguments of The New Sovereignty is that
coercive enforcement mechanisms are not only rarely used to ensure compliance with
international treaties, but they are also likely to be ineffective if used.48 According to the
Chayeses, “the fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an
acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty
organization, and the wider public.”49 The Chayeses argue that management tools, such
as transparency, reporting, verification and monitoring, dispute resolution and capacity

48
49

Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 2.
Id. at 25.
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building are the key to designing a compliance regime to encourage compliance. This
theory is commonly referred to in the literature as the “managerial school.”50

The managerial school argues that reasons relating to efficiency, interests and norms
explain the general propensity of states to comply with international law.51 First,
compliance is an efficient strategy because it saves recalculating the costs and benefits of
not complying.52 Secondly, it is generally in a state’s self interest to comply, as states are
unlikely to negotiate and consent to agreements contrary to their interests.53 Finally,
norms contribute to the general propensity of states to comply. The Chayeses define
norms as “prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation,
a sense that they ought to be followed.”54 They argue that compliance with a treaty is
motivated by agreement with the norms enunciated in the treaty.55 Also, one of the
fundamental norms of international law, pacta sunt servanda, “treaties are to be obeyed”
encourages compliance. Finally, the managerial school argues that where noncompliance does occur, this is not the result of willful disobedience.

The Chayeses identify three factors as the causes of non-compliance with international
law. These are ambiguity in the terms of an obligation, lack of capacity to carry out an
obligation and a change in circumstances.56 Given these factors, coercive enforcement
would not, according to the managerial school prevent non-compliance. Sanctions are
50

E.g. Downs et al., supra note 5, at 379.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 4.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 113.
55
Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes & Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 17, at 39, 42.
56
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 10.
51
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futile as a response to non-compliance because of the costs imposed on both the
sanctioning state and the sanctioned state. Illegitimacy is also identified by the
Chayesian approach as explaining the futility of sanctions, particularly where the
sanctions are imposed unilaterally. The Chayeses argue that, inter alia, unilateral
sanctions fail the requirement applicable to all law enforcement: that crucial
determinations should be made by basically fair procedures.57

At the core of the managerial school of thought is an emphasis on the interdependence
of the community of states. The need to belong to that community encourages
compliance with international norms and therein lies the Chayeses’ “New Sovereignty.”
They comment that “[c]onnection to the rest of the world and the political ability to be
an actor within it are more important than any tangible benefits in explaining compliance
with international regulatory agreements.”58 Koh captures their thesis as, “the impetus
of compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction, as it is fear of diminution of
status through loss of reputation.”59

B. Fairness Theory: Legitimacy and Equity
Thomas Franck’s fairness theory “admirably mirrors and complements” the
Chayesian approach to compliance.60 Although Franck does not specifically set out to
answer the compliance question, he argues that a perception that the law is fair

57

Id. at 106.
Id. at 27.
59
Supra note 14, at 2636.
60
Koh, id. at 2644.
58
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encourages compliance.61 His theory is presented as an analytical framework for a
critique of international law, where fairness is the defining criterion. Franck refers to
such a critique as engaging in fairness discourse.62

Franck defines fairness as having dual components: substantive and procedural.
Substantive fairness refers to distributive justice, or equity. While noting the difficulty in
defining equity, Franck argues that equity is developing into an important aspect of the
international legal system.63 He contends that the allocation among states of scarce
resources provides an area where notions of distributive justice are accepted as relevant
in international law.64

Legitimacy, the second component of Franck’s fairness, refers to “that attribute of a
rule which conduces to the belief that it is fair because it was made and is applied in
accordance with ‘right process.’”65 “Right process” is based on the contractarian
underpinnings of the sources of international law.66 According to Franck, indicators of
right process or legitimacy are determinacy (the clarity of the rule),67 symbolic validation
(cues signaling authority),68 coherence (treating like cases alike and relating in a

61

As Koh, id. at 2641 notes, Franck’s central question is not why do nations obey international law, but is
international law fair?
62
Supra, note 14 at 9.
63
Id. at 79.
64
Id. at 56.
65
Id. at 26.
66
Id. at 29.
67
Id. at 30.
68
Id. at 34.
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principled fashion to other rules of the same system),69 and adherence (conformity with
the international community’s procedural and institutional framework).70

Both aspects of fairness are important to encourage compliance with international law.
However, Franck recognizes that considerations of equity and legitimacy may not always
“pull in the same direction.”71 The legitimacy component privileges order, yet equity
privileges change by incorporating superceding notions of justice where to do so would
be more distributively just than the established rules. While acknowledging this
dichotomy, Franck believes it is not an insurmountable hurdle in the search for fairness.
Rather, fairness provides the conceptual tool to manage the change-order tension.72

One of Franck’s preconditions for analyzing fairness in international law is a sense of
community.73 Similar to the Chayesian approach, Franck suggests that sovereignty has a
new meaning in current international relations owing to the “contemporary state of global
interdependence.”74 Again, similar to the managerial school, his theory is normative, as
Franck argues that states obey international law because they believe they ought to.
Franck relies on the compliance pull of international norms developed through discourse.

69

Id. at 38.
Id. at 41.
71
Id. at 7.
72
Franck does not set out how fairness manages the two variables, but merely suggests that it is possible.
But see Gerry J. Simpson, Is International Law Fair?, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 615, 626 (1996) who reviews
Franck’s theory and notes Koskenniemi (MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989)) has demonstrated it is impossible to reconcile
procedural and distributive justice.
73
Supra note 14, at 10. The other precondition is moderate scarcity, which Franck argues describes the
existing situation.
74
Id. at 4. Note this part of Franck’s framework has attracted substantial criticism as many scholars dispute
the existence of a global community. Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the
Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944 (1997); Dino Kritsiotis,
Imagining the International Community, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 961 (2002).
70
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“If a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of legitimacy and justice, it is
more likely to be implemented and less likely to be disobeyed.”75 The field of MEAs
provides useful examples of how according to Franck, this works in practice.

Franck discuses the negotiation of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer (“Vienna Convention”)76 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) as an example of fairness discourse in
action. The ozone agreements created a regime where richer countries help poorer
countries to meet their undertakings to reduce, and eventually phase out all ozone
depleting substances.77 Franck argues that this is an acknowledgment of lesser-developed
countries’ fairness claims: “to exemption, to technology transfer, and to compensatory
financing.”78 For richer countries, providing the necessary assistance was seen as fair, as
well as efficient.79 Moreover, Franck suggests that the evidence of a substantial
reduction in the rate of emissions of ozone-depleting substances by 1993 supports his
case that fair agreements are more likely to be complied with.80
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In terms of compliance regimes for MEAs in general, Franck’s analysis suggests that
the current approach is on the right track. He argues the contemporary approach to
MEAs including, framework agreements (such as the Vienna Convention, or the FCCC),
secretariats generating scientific and economic data to assist implementing conferences,
and third-party processes for resolving disputes create “legitimate and legitimating
regimes.”81

However, contrary to the Chayeses’ analysis, which explicitly discusses sanctions, the
efficacy or otherwise of coercive enforcement is not a prominent feature of Franck’s
fairness theory. The logical inference of his theory is that if a rule is seen to be fair, then
coercive enforcement will be unnecessary. Despite this, he does not explicitly rule out
sanctions as an effective mechanism to secure compliance in some areas of international
law. For example, in the area of collective security, while not supporting the use of
sanctions, Franck notes they may have had some effect in causing Rhodesia and South
Africa to comply with international mandates.82 It is a logical extension of Franck’s
theory that if enforcement is employed, to be effective the mechanism will need
legitimacy. Franck’s theory however, has not gone uncriticized.83
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C. Transnational Legal Process: Koh’s “Missing Link”
Harold Koh argues that while both the Chayeses and Franck provide insights into
understanding why nations comply with international law, neither theory is complete.84
Koh argues that both theories emphasize voluntary obedience and internalized
compliance, but neither Franck nor the Chayeses explain how norm-internalization
occurs. Koh believes that transnational legal process provides the missing link.85

Transnational legal process is defined by Koh as “the process whereby an international
law rule is interpreted through the interaction of transnational actors in a variety of lawdeclaring fora, then internalized into a nation's domestic legal system.”86 Professor Koh
views this process as comprised of three phrases. The process starts with an interaction
provoked by one or more transnational actors, causing interpretation of an applicable
global norm.87 Koh notes that the aim of this provocation is not to coerce the other party
to comply with the norm, but to “internalize the new interpretation of the international
norm into the other party’s internal normative system.”88 A new legal rule is created
which will guide transnational interactions between the parties in the future, as well as
the internalization of these norms through future interactions.89 In sum, the three phases
are interaction, interpretation, and internalization.90
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Koh’s theory not only explains why nations obey international law, but also suggests a
course of action for persuading nations to continue to obey.91 Although his essay is a
preliminary theory as he has a book forthcoming,92 part of Koh’s strategy for encouraging
compliance includes empowering more actors to participate in the process.93 He also
proposes that further study of the transnational legal process is required. Using human
rights as an example, Koh suggests subjects of inquiry include the role of
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private business
entities and “transnational moral entrepreneurs,” and available fora for norm-enunciation
and elaboration.94

Similar to Franck, Koh does not engage in the debate about the effectiveness of
coercive enforcement. As Koh theorizes that nations obey international law because the
norms are internalized into domestic legal systems, enforcement through coercive
mechanisms is not an issue. Rather, Koh argues that we should seek to acquire a greater
understanding of the transnational legal process.

Treaty banned the development of space-based systems for territorial defense. The U.S. government
attempted to reinterpret the treaty to allow a proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Koh argues that
transnational legal actors, including a U.S. Senator and non-governmental organizations provoked a series
of interactions with the U.S. government challenging the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty to allow
the Strategic Defense Initiative. This process eventually led to the U.S. government executive branch
adopting the narrow interpretation and ensured U.S. compliance with international law.
90
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It is not clear however, how transnational legal process applies to MEAs as Koh draws
most of his examples from the area of human rights and security. Yet, other authors who
also note the importance of internalization of international norms have applied the theory
to the environmental context. Victor, while not opposed to the use of enforcement
(discussed below) comments on the significance of transnational legal process in
encouraging compliance. He suggests that, “[p]olicymakers could focus commitments on
‘liberal states’ in which internal public pressure, for example, from environmental
groups, and robust legal systems make it possible to enforce international commitments
from inside (ground-up) rather than outside (top-down).”95

Similarly, Young, a prominent international relations theorist emphasizes the
importance of incorporating international law into domestic politics.96 However, not all
authors agree that transnational legal process satisfactorily answers the compliance
question.

D. Reputational Theory: Rational Self- interested States
A newcomer to the compliance debate, Andrew Guzman challenges the theories of the
Chayeses, Franck and Koh for inadequately explaining the causal question, why nations
obey.97 Rather, Guzman argues that all three authors merely assert that they do.98 While
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still grounded in legal theory, Guzman draws on international relations literature to
develop a reputational theory of compliance.99

Guzman contends that reputational concerns and direct sanctions explain why states
comply with international law.100 His theory is founded on a model of rational selfinterested states.101 He argues that states will defect from international law when the
benefits outweigh the costs, applying classical prisoner’s dilemma game theory in mixed
motive problems.102 In the domestic setting, law solves the prisoner’s dilemma by
providing a penalty for defections.103 Guzman argues in international law that sanctions
prevent defection. He defines sanctions as “all costs associated with such a failure,
including punishment or retaliation by other states, and reputation costs that affect a
state’s ability to make commitments in the future.”104 When the costs of sanctions
outweigh benefits of defecting, nations will obey the law. According to Guzman, the
converse is also true. When sanctions, including the reputation effect of violating an
international norm do not outweigh the benefits of complying, states will defect.
Guzman argues that his theory provides an explanation for non-compliance with
international law, overlooked by some traditional legal scholarship.105
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Given the paucity of existing enforcement mechanisms in international law and MEAs
in particular, reputation is the key to Guzman’s theory. He argues that the reputation of a
state has value.106 For example, a reputation for compliance with international law
encourages cooperative relations with other states. Accordingly, violating international
law compromises that reputation and will affect future relations. Where, as sometimes
occurs, a country does not want to foster a reputation for high compliance, direct
sanctions provide the mechanism for securing compliance.

In putting reputational concerns at the hub of his theory, Guzman’s theory appears
similar to the Chayeses’ “New Sovereignty.” The Chayeses make a similar claim that
part of the answer to the compliance question is that states comply to avoid a bad
reputation on the world stage. Where Guzman and the Chayeses differ, is their reasons
for non-compliance. Guzman argues states defect where the cost of defection is not as
great as the benefits. Conversely, as noted above, the Chayeses argue defection occurs
because of ambiguity in the terms of the treaty, lack of capacity and a change in
circumstances.

However, both Guzman and the Chayeses agree that sanctions can be costly (on both
sanctioned and sanctioning states) and involve issues of legitimacy. Similar to the
Chayeses, one of the key legitimacy issues noted by Guzman is that sanctions are
generally imposed unilaterally by injured party states, rather than by a neutral third
party.107 Despite this problem, in some situations, sanctions can provide an efficient
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incentive to comply. Guzman argues that sanctions will work best in bilateral
relationships, and complex, ongoing relationships.108

Guzman notes that his reputational theory of compliance has its limits. In areas where
the stakes are high, such as state security, the compliance pull of maintaining a good
reputation weakens.109 He argues that loss of reputation will not outweigh the benefits of
defecting where the issue is of critical importance to the state.110 In the area of trade and
environmental regulation, however, Guzman asserts the stakes are smaller, and
international law can have real impact.111

Despite concluding that that environmental regulation is an area where international
law can have real impact, Guzman does not apply his theory in any depth to international
environmental law.112 Additionally, Guzman does not consider the argument presented
in the introduction, that while compliance with MEAs is high, this is in large part because
of the shallowness of the agreements. If MEAs are to have any real effect in responding
to global environmental problems, it appears likely that the depth of cooperation must
increase. The Kyoto Protocol provides the most recent example where the Parties have
introduced more onerous obligations to address the environmental problem.113 That is,
the stakes have risen and Guzman’s conclusion becomes less applicable. Here the debate

108

Id. at 1868.
Id. at 1883.
110
Id. at 1874, 1883.
111
Id. at 1885.
112
To illustrate the practical application of his reputational theory of compliance Guzman, id. at 1851
discusses bilateral investment treaties and their effect on country behavior. He argues that international law
will have greater effect on economic issues than on military issues.
113
Werksman, supra note 43, at 49 notes that these commitments “are arguably the most ambitious
environmental commitments ever set by an international agreement.”
109

24

moves beyond compliance, into addressing the effectiveness of international
environmental law.

E. Beyond the Law: International Relations Theory
The effectiveness of international law, rather than compliance is the traditional
concern of international relations theorists.114 While a detailed examination of the
various international relations’ perspectives is beyond the scope of this essay,115 one of
the leading international relations scholars, Oran Young, engages in the compliance
debate.116 Young focuses on regimes, defined as “social institutions consisting of agreed
upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of
actors in specific issue areas.”117 His concern is understanding the effectiveness of
regimes, measuring effectiveness by behavioral consequences. That is, “whether
regimes or governance systems play a role in shaping or guiding the behavior of those …
whose behavior is targeted by a regime’s provisions.”118 Therefore, Young’s analysis is
focused not on why nations comply, but rather on what are the sources of effective
regimes.119
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However, despite concentrating on effectiveness, Young engages in the compliance
debate. Young’s view is that the management approach to compliance is generally
preferable to enforcement. He argues it is simplistic to rely on enforcement to capture
collective benefits, as the relationship between actor behavior and compliance is more
complex.120 In an analysis of the effectiveness of several international regimes
addressing environmental problems, Young and his colleagues identify several
mechanisms, or behavioral pathways that operate to influence state behavior.121 They
conclude that all mechanisms influence the effectiveness of regimes, and that the degree
of influence varies across different regimes.122

Nonetheless, Young falls towards the far end of the compliance continuum as he is not
entirely opposed to enforcement. “Rather, [his] analysis suggests that enforcement is
more important under some conditions than others and that circumstances exist in which
enforcement mechanisms can operate effectively in the absence of anything we would
normally call a “government.”123

Again, similar to the Chayeses and Guzman, Young points out that sanctions may pose
legitimacy concerns.124 Moreover, legitimacy emerges as an important factor in several
of the regimes identified by Young et al. as effective. Legitimacy falls under one the
behavioral mechanisms labeled “Regimes as Bestowers of Authority,” where “social
norms rooted in considerations of legitimacy or authoritativeness often guide the
120
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behavior of individuals and collective entities alike.”125 Young concludes that in many of
the cases studied the model of a regime as a bestower of authority was an important
dynamic contributing to the effectiveness of the regime.126 For example, successes
relating to the international oil pollution regime are partly attributable to the legitimacy
and authority accorded by states and non-state actors to the regime, allowing the
promulgation of regulations to address vessel-source marine pollution.127

F. The Enforcement Model: Political Economics Theory
The final theory on the compliance continuum is the enforcement model of political
economists Downs et al..128 They argue that while coercing compliance is not a panacea,
enforcement should not be ruled out as an option. Their theory directly challenges the
Chayesian approach. The key critique of the enforcement model is that the managerial
school misinterprets the evidence. Downs et al. argue it is a mistake to infer that
enforcement is unnecessary from the relatively high compliance levels and lack of
enforcement mechanisms.129 Downs and his co-authors point out that as treaty
obligations are the result of consensual agreements, states are unlikely to either negotiate,
or enter into, agreements that contain obligations they are unable to meet. 130 They
characterize the basis for state selection as “depth of cooperation.”
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Depth of cooperation refers to the extent to which a treaty “requires states to depart
from what they would have done in its absence.”131

According to the Downsian132 view,

deep cooperation is rare in international accords.133 Downs et al. discuss the set of arms
agreements made by the United States post 1945 to support their case. Specifically, the
Outer Space Treaty,134 the Seabed Arms Control Treaty135 and the Antarctic Treaty136 are
cited as examples of agreements to maintain the status quo. Neither the Soviet Union,
nor the United States had either a strategic mission for a major weapons system in these
areas, or cost-effective plans at the time the treaties were signed.137 Downs et al.
comment:

While we are not denying that obtaining tangible reassurance of a rival’s
intentions through a treaty is valuable, it is difficult to argue that these treaties
exhibit the deep cooperation that would have taken place if the superpowers had

mistakes is low for both, despite reduced rehearsals for the orchestra subject to funding cuts. Downs et al.
argue it is a mistake to conclude from this that funding for rehearsals does not improve performance. They
argue that it is likely that the orchestra with fewer rehearsals chose a less demanding piece. That is,
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each agreed to terminate major modernization programs or dramatically reduce
their defense budgets.138

Moreover, they also suggest the probability that if either state significantly broke an
agreement, the other state would retaliate in kind, supports their case that enforcement
contributes to compliance.139

Downs et al. argue that an absence of deep cooperation is also evident in international
environmental law. 140 For example, in contrast to Franck, who cites the Montreal
Protocol as an effective MEA, Downs et al. are not as convinced. They refer to studies
that suggest the Montreal Protocol did not contribute to altering state behavior, as states
were already committed to reducing chlorofluorocarbon emissions.141 Another example
discussed by Downs et al. is the Mediterranean Plan,142 which responds to pollution in the
Mediterranean Sea. Downs et al. argue the Plan has no meaningful restrictions on
dumping and pollution has increased.143
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Additionally, Downs et al. argue that where they believe MEAs have been successful,
enforcement played a greater role than the managerialists would credit. For instance,
they argue that the creation of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone improved the
effectiveness of fishing agreements issued under international fisheries commissions, as it
made enforcement easier. Before the creation of the exclusive economic zone, Downs
and his colleagues argue compliance was problematic because states were not pressuring
their fisherman to obey the rules.144 The key problem was lack of incentive to obey the
rules where it was perceived others are likely to disobey.145

In sum, the crux of the Downsian view is that there is a connection between the depth
of cooperation and the level of punishment necessary to maintain compliance where there
are strong incentives to defect. “The political economy theory predicts that … [an]
increase in the incentive for defection will have to be offset by increases in the size of the
threatened punishment.”146 As Downs notes, there are difficulties in testing this theory,
such as the lack of enforcement mechanisms in MEAs. Moreover, if there are
enforcement mechanisms that are not used, the effect on negotiations, which took place
in the “shadow of a more formal enforcement process,” is difficult to determine.147
Despite these difficulties, Downs cites an analysis of fifty environmental agreements as
evidence supporting the enforcement model. Each agreement was assigned a depth of
cooperation score and a level of enforcement score.148 The result was that the strongest
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enforcement provisions accompanied the agreements requiring the deepest
cooperation.149

The Downsian view is a persuasive critique. As noted in the introduction, despite the
proliferation of MEAs addressing an extensive range of global environmental problems,
environmental issues are not being solved. The enforcement model is the only theory in
the compliance continuum providing a compelling explanation for this reality.
Furthermore, Downs is not alone in his caution against dismissing the efficacy of
coercive enforcement mechanisms, especially where more onerous obligations are
introduced.150 For example, Victor agrees with Downs et al. that coercive enforcement
measures are sometimes needed, particularly when the cooperation is deep and incentives
to defect are high.151 Victor is also critical of the current record of MEAs, concurring
with Downs that the high compliance rate is explained by shallow cooperation. One of
the examples Victor discusses to support his claim that in international cooperation “the
lowest common denominator prevails,”152 is the regulation of sulfur oxide emissions
under the 1985 Sulfur Protocol.153 He comments that because sulfur was a leading cause
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of urban air pollution several countries were already regulating sulfur oxide emissions
prior to the conclusion of the 1985 Sulfur Protocol.154 In sum, Victor’s answer to the
compliance question concurs with Downs: “high compliance is the consequence of
shallow cooperation.”155

III. TAKING STOCK
A. Converging Theories?
Overall, the literature reveals that there is no general consensus on why nations
comply with international law in general, or specifically with MEAs. However, some
scholars have suggested that general compliance principles can be drawn from the
theories, even the ostensibly contradictory views of the management school and the
enforcement model.

Danish argues that an analysis of the substance of the managerial school reveals the
Chayeses are not as opposed to enforcement as they assert.156 He notes that elements of
the managerial school, such as verification and deterrence are in fact elements of
enforcement.157 Also, relying on threats of disapproval affecting a state’s reputation to
secure compliance falls closer to enforcement, rather than management. According to
Danish, “[n]o matter how they frame it, the regimes of the New Sovereignty would do
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more than merely offer technical and financial assistance. They would also coerce.”158
He re-conceptualizes the Chayesian approach as a managerial strategy and a social
enforcement strategy,159 where social enforcement refers to enforcement through
leveraging loss of reputation and standing in the international community.160

Perhaps Danish is correct in suggesting that some of the differences between the
Chayeses and Downs et al. are semantic, depending on how each theory defines
enforcement. Even so, it is clear that the Chayeses are opposed to enforcement in the
form of sanctions,161 and that Downs et al. are not. Additionally, as will be further
discussed below, both approaches fundamentally differ as to the reasons for instances of
non-compliance.

Keohane also seeks to reconcile the two ends of the compliance continuum, labeling
the divergent views as the instrumentalist and the normative optic. 162 The
instrumentalist optic focuses on interests. According to instrumentalists, “rule and norms
will matter only if they affect calculations of interests by agents.”163 Instrumentalism is
largely the domain of political scientists and thus falls at the end of the continuum with
international relations theory. Keohane’s normative optic describes international legal
theory, where the legitimacy of rules explains compliance. Both Franck’s fairness theory
and the Chayeses’ managerial approach are classified as normative.
158
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Keohane agues that neither the normative or instrumentalist optic adequately explains
how predicted results follow from the theory’s assumptions.164 In an attempt to
synthesize the two optics, he suggests that interests, reputations and institutions are
common to the causal pathways of both optics. Instrumentalists’ interests are “power,
wealth, and position (position in the international system with regard to states and offices
for individuals).”165 However, while Keohane argues international lawyers also consider
interests, he notes it is a legitimate concern (also raised by political scientists) that it can
be difficult to identify whose, and which, interest.166

The importance of reputation in encouraging compliance is also common to both
optics.167 But, Keohane points out that reputation encompasses not only a reputation for
keeping agreements, but can be “less savory,” such as for punishing enemies and does not
always encourage compliance.168 Downs and Jones also argue reputation is not as
simplistic as legal theorists suggest.169 In considering the importance of reputation,
Downs and Jones conclude that first, nations have varying levels of reliability in relation
to different agreements.170 Secondly, considerable evidence supports the contention that
states possess multiple or segmented reputations.171 In the MEA context Downs and
Jones argue that presently, defection appears to have narrow implications for treaties in
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other areas. They conclude that in international environmental regulation reputation
contributes the least to promoting compliance.172

The linchpin of Keohane’s synthesis is institutions. Again, he argues both optics
believe institutions matter.173 However, Keohane emphasizes the importance of
institutions as they allow the fusion of the normative and instrumentalist optic.
According to Keohane, interests depend on reputations.174 He argues that interests are
changeable, depending on information, as well as causal beliefs and principled beliefs.
Therefore, Keohane argues norms influence interests. Reputational concerns also
influence interests. And, to complete the argument, reputations depend on institutions, as
they “affect what kind of reputation it is most useful to acquire.”175

Finally, in considering the possible convergence of the differing theories along the
compliance continuum, legitimacy emerges as a crucial consideration. While only
Franck puts legitimacy at the center of his analysis, the Chayeses, Guzman and Young all
note that the use of enforcement raises legitimacy issues. Although not directly
considering the compliance question in international law, Brunnee and Toope reach a
similar conclusion, commenting that “ … the penchant of some international lawyers for
demanding “enforcement” of a supposed norm will often prove ineffective if there is no
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common acceptance of the norm’s legitimacy.”176 Moreover, Bodansky argues that the
search for legitimacy is the coming challenge of international environmental law.177

Bodansky claims that to effectively respond to global environmental problems,
stronger institutions and decision-making mechanisms not dependent on consensus
among states are required.178 Although consent has traditionally formed the justification
of authority in international environmental law, consensus decision-making usually
results in weak agreements,179 or in Downsian terminology “shallow cooperation.”
However, stronger international governance based on non-consensual decision-making
raises the question of legitimacy, defined by Bodansky as the “justification for
authority.”180 He argues that owing to the lack of an international demos, democracy
cannot fill the legitimacy deficit.181 Therefore, Bodansky calls for further work on how
to legitimize international environmental regimes.182

The most vocal proponent of enforcement, Downs, does not directly respond to the
legitimacy challenge.183 Nonetheless, it is not clear that Downs is only advocating for
unilateral sanctions, which pose the biggest legitimacy threat. Therefore, attempting to
legitimize the use of enforcement within a MEA framework may contribute to
reconciling the key point of contention, whether enforcement encourages compliance.
176

Supra note 99 at 31.
Daniel Bodansky, The legitimacy of international governance: A coming challenge for international
environmental law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 596 (1999).
178
Id. at 623.
179
Id. at 607.
180
Id. at 601.
181
Id. at 615.
182
Id. at 623.
183
See supra note 147, at 321 where Downs comments on the political economic view of enforcement
strategies noting “[t]he legitimacy of the strategy under international law is rarely an issue.”
177

36

B. Key Points of Contention
The literature divides over the use of enforcement. The Chayeses advocate the
extreme view that enforcement will not prevent non-compliance. In contrast, the
instrumentalists say, that when there are incentives to defect, enforcement is required.
The underlying disagreement is therefore, not why nations comply, but why sometimes,
they do not.

The Chayeses argue non-compliance with an international law is not because of
willful disobedience. Rather, as noted above, it is because of uncertainty in the terms of
the treaty, lack of capacity or modified circumstances. Therefore, the use of sanctions
would not have any effect on compliance, as it would not influence any of the causal
factors leading to defection.

The instrumentalists challenge those reasons. According to Guzman and Downs et al.,
states disobey international law when it is in their interest to do so.184 Moreover, Downs
argues that it is difficult to test the managerial reasons of non-compliance, as they do not
necessarily preclude premeditated defection.185 First, Downs is cynical about the extent
to which ambiguity really explains non-compliance. He notes the political economy
model would “suspect that ambiguity is often built into the agreement intentionally as a
device that negotiators can use strategically to reap the political benefits of reaching an
agreement when one might otherwise not be achieved.”186 Secondly, Downs argues that
capacity limitations may also be related to deliberate non-compliance. For example,
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administrators responsible for implementing the detail of an agreement may not be under
the perfect control of the policymakers responsible for signing the agreement. The
administrator may, according to Downs, “find it more profitable or simply easier to do a
less vigorous job of implementation than he might be capable.”187

However, it is important to emphasize that Downs et al. only support enforcement
when the stakes are high. This follows from their central contention that the shallowness
of current MEAs explains the high compliance rate. If what has been agreed to
represents current domestic policies, then non-compliance is not an issue. The Chayeses,
Franck and Koh do not adequately respond to this. In doing so, the normative theories
appear to overlook a key empirical observation relating to the shallowness of many
MEAs.

To be fair, all three normative theories do not explicitly focus on compliance and
MEAs. Rather, they are developing a general theory of compliance with international
law. However, as a general theory, it should be applicable to any policy area. This essay
suggests that either all three theories are incomplete, or that, understanding compliance
with MEAs requires separate consideration.

C. Suggestions for Further Research
Accordingly, further research is required to ascertain whether any general theory of
compliance is possible. The Chayeses, Franck, Koh and Guzman all consider the
compliance question in the broader context of international law as a whole. It is not clear
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that any such general theory is possible. Young comments that, “[t]here is no reason to
assume that international institutions – or any other social institutions will be equally
effective (or ineffective) across space, time, and issue area.”188 For example, the reason
nations may or may not comply with international humans rights law, may differ to
international environmental law. Young also agues, that within the environmental
context there may not be one model regime applicable to all environmental issues.189
Rather than seeking for a “recipe” to apply across the board, he suggests we should
interpret each problem based on understandings gained from in depth analysis of other
problems.

Additionally, in evaluating whether the recent call for stronger enforcement is
necessary to secure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and other MEAs, scholars
should focus their research on why nations defect from MEAs, as this remains one of the
key points of contention. As noted by Keohane, “[t]o understand success, we need to
understand failure.”190

Finally, further research is required into possible stronger enforcement mechanisms, as
there are few models. In considering possibilities, scholars should concentrate on the
legitimacy of these mechanisms, given that the lack of legitimacy is a common concern
among theorists opposed to enforcement.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, despite the recent proliferation of literature addressing the compliance
question, scholars remain divided as to why nations obey international law. The
literature reveals a contest between the Chayesian approach arguing for managing
compliance, and the Downsian view supporting enforcement when there are high
incentives to defect. While these two views represent both ends of the compliance
continuum, not all scholars engage in the debate. Koh in particular, takes a different tack
to the compliance question, focusing instead on the domestic internalization of
international norms.

However, in the context of MEAs, as countries focus on implementing the numerous
treaties in force, the resolution of the compliance question is a big issue. As noted in the
introduction, during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations nations believed an increase in
obligations beyond those in the FCCC should be accompanied by stronger enforcement
mechanisms. Was that sentiment well founded?

My answer to the question do we need stronger enforcement mechanisms to secure
compliance with MEAs, is yes, when there are strong incentives to defect. Moreover,
increasing the effectiveness of the international response to global environmental
problems calls for more onerous obligations, thereby creating stronger incentives to
defect, and the depth of cooperation. To be effective, however, stronger enforcement
mechanisms must posses legitimacy. Creating legitimate enforcement mechanisms to
secure compliance with MEAs exhibiting deeper cooperation is the key to reconciling the
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disparate ends of the compliance continuum, and address global environmental
degradation.
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